by Andjelka Badnjar Gojnić, RWTH Aachen University
‘Durability, which alone determinates if a thing can exist as a thing and endure in the world as a distinct entity, remains the supreme criterion’ [i]
- The Collective, the Wall and the Law
In 1958, in her major philosophical work The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt refers to the term object in its Latin origin obicere as ‘something thrown’ or ‘put against.’[ii] This opposition serves as the basis upon which all further distinctions such as private and public, necessity and freedom, shame and honor, labor and action and man and the world are drawn. The human is finally positioned as a condition emerging between nature and the world. Once the world has been made up, the human can appear though activities of labor, work and action, each positioned differently between the poles of nature and the world. The appearance of the world built by ‘the work of our hands’[iii] serves as the ‘objective’ background that ‘stand against’ and ‘stabilize human life’ otherwise essentially subjective one. Being related to the ‘same chair and the same table…a man can retrieve their sameness’[iv], reconstruct their identity and overcome being part of a species no different than animal ones within elementary force and the eternal movement of indifferent nature. The sum of the things constituting human artifice stand as the world in its objective sense of being thrown in between man and nature. Such a world can be opposed to life, it is outside of life and unrelated to any of the bodily matters of reproduction, be they mental or physiological. It is the ‘worldly character of produced thing – its location, function and length of stay in the world’ which makes the distinction between ‘bread’ and ‘table’ and finally demonstrates the difference between a baker and a carpenter.[v] The criterion of the world understood as tangible, durable, permanent, and above all outside of the natural is an evaluative one. Contrary to the labor subjected to the necessity of the reproduction of life and thus the most natural of the three human activities, fabrication as a result of work produces an end beyond doubt: ‘an internally new thing with enough durability to remain in the world as independent entity added to the human artifice.’[vi] To have both a definitive beginning and a predicable end is a mark of fabrication, whose object further can be only multiplied instead of subjected to the repetition of the urged biological cycle of consumption. Although eventually subjected to dissolution, use objects – contrary to consumer goods and products of action – are present in the world long enough to stabilize nature and enable humans to appear through ‘products of action and speech…which lack tangibility of other things and are even less durable and more futile than what we produce for consumption.’[vii] Products of the action, words and deeds of the actor finally depend only upon ‘human plurality, upon the constant presence of other who can see and hear’[viii] by ‘living as a distinct and unique being among equals.’[ix]
The collective, in its notion of being done by man acting as a group, is a temporary state that falls into a web of human affairs. It is a status that has been agreed upon through men speaking and acting together. As such it is closest to Arendt’s concept of togetherness in the sense of being ‘with others neither for nor against them’[x] and having ‘inter-est which lies between people and can relate and bind them together.’[xi] Inter-est such as in-between varies depending on the group of people and constantly discloses itself by the agents of action and speech. As such speech and action are essential conditions for the collective and this is distinctive from collective action, as it would be rather ambiguous to address such a concept within Arendt’s argument. Namely, action is a highly individual condition by which man insert himself to the human plurality where in order to appear, one needs to disclose and to expose himself within the brightness of glory. Men thus seek to ‘reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world.’[xii] This appearance is very distinct from the exposure of ‘physical identities…without any activity…in the unique shape of body and sound of the voice.’[xiii] Contrary to the labor, action is as far as possible from the realm of the natural and the actor might be the only one being freed from bodily necessities and emotional constraints who discloses himself in front of others, seeking pride and excellence. Thus, it is not the virtue of negotiation but of competitiveness in excellence that channels the final result of men acting together. The collective, rather than being a collective action, is an event that emerges out of the situation in which each man acts uniquely, exposes and competes. Essentially based on the individual, such collective shifts extensively as regards the words and deeds of the doers, not having any divine aura of its own. Though Arendt gives primacy to the individual as the man qua man situation, the unpredictable, irreversible and fragile character of action and speech are in constant danger of being absorbed by the nature of man with his necessities and emotional constraints. Thus, it is for the sake of the futility of action and speech that Arendt keeps the independency and background character of the object of the world as a guardian for their appearance. It is in the same way that object in all its tangibility, relates to the collective: ‘as a table located between those who sit around it’, ‘a world of things in between those who have it in common…that like every in-between relates and separates men at the same time.’[xiv]
Such an object is not human, let alone natural: it is the outer device with which the man of action relates and identifies in order to appear. Referring to the Greek polis, Arendt states that ‘before men begging to act, a definitive space had to be secured and a structure built where all actions could take place’[xv], the space being the public realm of the polis, while the law acts as its structure. The wall and the law are made by the architect and the legislator as the builder of a city and a lawmaker. These could be commissioned from abroad and need to be finished before any political activity begins. ‘These tangible entities’ – the wall and the law – ‘were not the content of politics themselves’[xvi] but the space of appearance, where less tangible products such as action and speech can gain the reality of being seen and heard before an audience of their fellow man acting together. As such no architect or lawmaker is an actor but rather they are fabricators, providing the infrastructure for the gathering of the men sharing words and deeds. They are not even personalized as ‘public space in the image of the fabricated object…carried only the implication of ordinary mastership where the compelling factor lies not in the person of craftsman but in impersonal object of his art or craft.’[xvii] This assured neutrality of the object is a condition sin qua non, as without the stabilizing boundaries of wall and law, the public could not survive the moment of action and speech. Furthermore, without the independence of the object and homo faber to make it, acting and speaking together could not be remembered. It is homo faber that is a guardian of the man of action, just as the ‘sharing of words and deeds’[xviii] is guarded by the object. As a background, the object is not end itself as it cannot create nor action or form a collective. It can only serve as a neutralized precondition in advance and as a guarantee of the eventual appearance as ‘for what appears to all, this we call Being’ and ‘whatever lacks appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but without reality.’[xix]
- The Collective and the Dissolution of an Object
Without the object thrown against nature no action, speech or state of the collective exists as there is no background for plurality. Although essential in deriving the human, the object of the world is the ultimate aim itself only in the case of homo faber. In the cases of two other heroes of Arendt – the man of action and the animal laborans– the object and the world are an assumed precondition sin qua non in the case of the former, while they are disguised forever in the case of the latter.
Contrary to our introduction of the collective as done by people acting as a group, Arendt refers to the collective always using the same connotation of mass society which enlarged the realm of the domestic household over the public one, until the final destruction of the latter. We can trace the ‘substitution of society of a collective man-kind for individual man as its subject’ [xx] or the ‘collective nature of labor’ with its ‘loss of all awareness of individuality’ whose ‘values are no different from pleasure derived from eating and drinking in company’ and thus rest on the ‘human’s body metabolism with nature.’[xxi] The collective is related to bodily performance such taking food and belonging to the same biological species and ultimately rests on sameness instead of equality. These connotations of the collective are followed by the impossibility of ‘collective ownership (as) a contradiction in terms’[xxii] as property and the possession of an object is an essentially individual characteristic. The loss of property appears as a direct consequence of the initial loss of a place to hide and to labor within: a man’s household. By keeping the realm of nature away from the public realm, equality in antiquity meant having to exit the household and enter public life: ‘where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show through unique deeds…that he was best of all.’[xxiii] With the substitution of private property – as an individually possessed tangible object – by the intangible common wealth of the enormous ‘family’ of society, the boundaries withdrew leaving man to float within modes of behaviorism that replaced action. With lost distinction, the sameness of society emerges: a large number of people, ‘crowded together’ with their ‘almost irrespirable inclination toward despotism…of a person or of majority rule.’[xxiv] Arendt points to great numbers which account for conformism, behaviorism and automatism in human affairs with their statistical uniformity and scientific outlook as the main traits for human action. ‘The more people there are the most likely they are to behave and less likely to tolerate non-behavior.’[xxv] In relation to the large number, there is no crucial difference between totalitarian or liberal constitutions apart from the fact that the former took the reality of conflict and the latter the ‘natural harmony of interests’ as their starting points. Both are rooted in the ‘communistic fiction’ that society has one interest as a whole, which derives itself primarily from the household realm rather from any class interest, as advocated by Marx. Large numbers give rise to the social sciences as ‘behavioral sciences’ that ‘aim to reduce man as a whole until the level of a conditioned and behaving animal’ until ‘social behavior has become the standard for all regions of life.’[xxvi]
The issue of great number followed by behaviorism apparently excludes any chance of action as a possibility to begin anew, rather than to behave as predicted and as statistically covered. The collective understood as oneness – a sum of parts constituting a whole – replaces the collective as a shifting state of men gathering and acting together. Within the realm of society, the latter collective apparently is not possible at all and this is most explicitly manifested in the loss of the object of the world.
It is the world alienation rather than Marx’s self-alienation that is the ‘hallmark of the modern age’ as ‘enormous mundane activity is possible without any consideration for the world but only worry and care about the self.’[xxvii] Transmitting to the artifact natural role of consuming, monuments become not outer any more but rather an extension of biological life itself. Although a fence, a table, a chair or house, remain present, these are not worldly but ‘natural’ and nondurable. By losing the outer quality of the object, the difference between the tangible and intangible is blurred, shifting things from the world toward an ever-circulating natural swing. Instead of serving as a background for the human, the object is moved to the enlarged natural environment of man serving as an extension of his body from its primordial origin toward industrial equipment.
- Human / Non-human: In Search of an Environment / Object
One year after first publication of The Human Condition, familiar values related to habitat and the issue of large numbers based upon sociological analysis and the study of man’s behavior were the main preoccupations of the third generation of modern architects at the Otterlo Meeting in 1959.
Oskar Newman’s report book CIAM ’59 in Otterlo begins with the Adalbert Ames’s quote: ‘the processes that underlie our perception of our immediate internal world and those that underlie our perception of social relationships are fundamentally the same.’ Participants met ‘in the peace and quiet’ of the Kröller-Müller Foundation under the working title ‘The Group for the Research of Social and Visual Inter-relationships’. The meeting was organised by the coordinating group established at La Sarraz 1957 comprised of Bakema, Rogers, Roth, Voelcker and Wogenscky and counted 43 international participants invited according to the list made by the coordinating group. The event was funded by the government of the Netherlands, whose representative pointed out the difficult task of contemporary architects in order to fulfill ‘the happy feeling of social prosperity in which there is no longer a place for slum-dwellings’ and to search for a design based on the ‘life scheme and the shape of present and future society.’[xxviii] Bakema, in his introductory talk, called for the emergence of establishing architecture as ‘three-dimensional expression of human behavior’ in order to operate the ‘function of human identification with the ever extending universal space.’[xxix] After eight days of panels presenting individual work followed by discussions, the official conclusion rested upon the distinction of participants into two groups: a neutral and an aggressive one. The latter – that would go on – showed an attempt to understand architecture as a language ‘communicating directly about human behavior.’[xxx]
Rather than the official division, the meeting was actually characterized by another split. The most prominent advocates of a new language for modern architecture came into debate with Italian participation lead by Ernesto Rogers. The heated discussion following Rogers’ presentation of the Torre Velasca in Milan was charged with a critique led by Peter Smithson and Jaap Bakema and followed by Kenzō Tange. Their accusations relied on a historic understanding of architecture, describing the Torre Velasca in terms of its closed form, formalistic realism and as a quick solution to the problem of identity finally declaring the work done as unacceptable. The distinction was historically recognized as an origin of two approaches toward the roles of nature and history in modern architecture.[xxxi] From this point on, the distinction can be further traced toward two broader thoughts behind: reaction on establishment of the field of ethology with domain of anthropology on one hand and constant reversal to the antique on another. Following the first, Team 10 concept for the human habitat rested upon influence of anthropological sources.[xxxii] In contrast, the autonomy of the human condition in regard to the nature perhaps is most accurately present in Italian participation. As such, the origin of the conflict could be seen as a spot to unite different constellations on relation of the ethos of collective and the object within postwar modernism. Under conditions in which architects ‘will be asked to build billions of dwellings’, this being not a numerical problem alone but one also limited by sociological, economical, geographical, political and plastic conditions, [xxxiii] the attempt to translate this collective into materiality resulted in urged search for its object.
Par Nous pour Nous was the slogan of Aldo van Eyck’s introductory panel for presentation of his Children Home in Amsterdam and Congress building project in Jerusalem. According to van Eyck, after leaving the Euclidian groove, art and science have expanded the universe – ‘the outside and inside universe.’[xxxiv] With this awareness, this period of ours requires a new language, one at the same time old and new. The language is old as ‘man is always and essentially the same’ and this is most explicit in the constant human proportions that architecture is constantly rediscovering. ‘Archaic principles of human nature’ and a reconciliation of basic values need to be taken into account as an absolute condition of one. This is drawn into a status quo in the same way as biological necessity: ‘Man breathes both in and out; when is architecture going to do the same?’[xxxv] Accordingly to Bakema’s ‘architecture as a three dimensional extension of human behavior’, the object is equalized with bodily functions. The language is new as society is new. By contrast with the individual, who is old, primordial and constant with his physiological and cognitive processes, society shifts and is another polarity of the ‘dual phenomenon’, the two of which are supposed to reconcile through the issue of the ‘in-between’ nature of the object. Van Eyck concludes his theoretical introduction with the example of the house: ‘me inside and you outside or vice versa…with you inside, me outside, two worlds clashing no transition, individual on one side, the collective on another’, a lots of barriers of society ‘with architect so poor in spirit to provide a door…, hair-raising, brutal, like a guillotine…Each time we pass through such door we are split into two.’[xxxvi]
An attempt to provide an object with a blurred distinction between outside and inside in high interaction with the body was made through the Children’s Home of Amsterdam. ‘The whole thing is both outside and inside whether you are inside or outside.’[xxxvii] Sometimes there are cupolas above, sometimes there is sky, interior street walls are like exterior walls, ‘lots of tiny mirrors embedded in the concrete’, ‘the electric lighting is like street lighting’, ‘illuminating spaces are shifting with darkness’, ‘child’s movement (is) as violent as outside. ‘[xxxviii] In the search for the ‘dual phenomena of the individual and the collective without wrapping the meaning of either’[xxxix] the object becomes convertor of human behavior between the two. By withdrawing any difference between inside and outside, private and public, the object gains the role of a somatic extension of the biological human, always converting him from one to the number and vice versa. Appropriated by man, the object becomes natural itself and upgrades the collective body made from the human and the industrial, while placing it within the abstract context of sun, wind, rain, earth, highway and airplane. With the loss of its background character, this ‘behavioral’ object offers ultimate certainty to the ‘just beginning humanism’[xl] and the ultimate intimacy of a man walking through his surrounding environment in the manner of a savage walking through the forest.
This is certainly not in accordance with Arendt’s reliance on Greek materialism, which argues for the object serving as a neutral background for action governed by expertise – instead, the house in stake actually expresses all the inhabitability of modern age. [xli] With the language unable to correspond to any historical period, even the contemporary, van Eyck’s work constantly shows an attempt to reduce the house to its constituent universal elements of wall, roof, celling as a system of signifiers. This new environment seeks both universal and primordial expression in last consequences of the ethnological discourse on humanism.
Against this ‘behavioral’ aspect of the object maybe mostly explicit in van Eyck’s studies on the performances of the child and its surroundings, but actually present to the majority of ‘right side’ participants, stands the most discussed case of the Otterlo event: Ernesto Rogers’s panel with The Torre Velasca.
At the very beginning of his talk, Rogers immediately sets up limit by addressing the height of the Madellina at the top of Milan Duomo as the paramount criterion with no building allowed to be any higher. Although there was no deliberate reference to regional medieval towers as historical quotation per se, the similarities of form occur due to similar conditions, such as insufficient land area and the search for light and ideal views.[xlii] In contrast to the constancy of always-universal man in van Eyck case, here the fabrication condition is relevant and the artifact stays out of the human realm. The object is a result of a technique and of a set of pragmatic decisions while the rhetoric is apparently totally reduced. ‘It is important to speak technically, because technique requires precise decisions.’[xliii] This is quite clear in the way the architect presented the work by stressing pure facts and providing short conclusions such as: ‘steel in Italy would be too expensive so the concrete is used’, ‘windows are standard production’, ‘panels between columns are prefabricated elements’, ‘the construction is a very simple one’, ‘it would be impossible to know who the occupants will be’, ‘two main colours were used’ – a brick one from the Middle Ages and the colour of stone from the neo-classical period, yet none of these were chosen due to sentimental reason, but as ‘a technical approach to the vision.’[xliv]
‘We put the apartments above the offices so that might have better access to the sky, the cleaner air and in particular splendid view.’[xlv] While the first two reasons recall typically modernist concepts, it is particularly the splendid view that is main cause for elevating apartments. Yet, the view is not toward any of the traditional modernist symbols such as greenery, traffic or exposure to the airplanes passing over the heads of The Children’s Home in Amsterdam. Instead it is a view toward the fabric of the historical city that serves as the main reason for elevating apartments as well as for increasing the height of offices in a way to correspond to classical proportions of interior rooms instead of to modernist ones. ‘It was necessary to provide space for offices of a big surface area and this allowed us to give them a corresponding increase in height.’[xlvi] The view perceived from the interior constitutes the sum of the human artifact in the same way as the view toward the tower intensifies the recognizable image of a familiar object. Additionally, the corners of the tower are chamfered with the windows placed in, thus dissolving the cubical volume of the building into the mere plane picture. In the tower, almost seen as a two-dimensional image of a city organized with the articulation of windows, the structural components of modern architecture actually serve to intensify the type components of classicism. For this reason Rogers identifies Mies as the only modern architect from whom one could learn: as the language of Mies implies, gentrification in the constitution of an object in a tradition of commonly recognizable codes serves as the background to the human. ‘He is the only architect modern in the sense that Palladio was in his time’, for whom ‘the idea of plans and schemes was the idea of giving a model.’[xlvii] The quality of the permanence of a model is at the core of Arendt’s reference to Plato’s interpretation of the word idea or ‘shape’.[xlviii] This is what guides the craftsman who makes beds and tables in accordance with an idea, with his inner eye looking on the shape of the bed as envisioned instead of the real one. As such, the idea is more durable than the concrete thing as it derives from the ‘oneness of the model’, according to which a multitude of perishable things will appear, as the model exists before fabrication starts and remains after it has come to an end.
The persistence of the model annihilates novelty throughout all speech such as ‘I don’t see our work as sort of revolution at all’[xlix] and constantly positions the object within a limit. Thus, the limits being the constraints of industry, the acceptance of the language of modern architecture where it fits well such as ‘the structure is expressed as …we think that articulation of the structure is one of good qualities of modern architecture’[l] or simply the apparently indifferent acceptance of the impossibility of acknowledging the user. Yet, by this, Rogers and his followers do not abandon interfering in the relationship of the individual and the collective. They instead give up rhetoric on holistic collectivity relevant to the rest of the attempts to structure the environment according to the levels of neighborhood gatherings within a society of a large number. Rogers seeks the fabrication of an object as a counterpoint to man instead of an environment being an alter ego of men’s behaviorism. Such an object is not biological, but instead it is completely alien to nature and alien to the human as well. Bearing in mind Arendt distinction between the nature of man and human, where human is possible only when man is freed from the natural and the natural is no different than animal, Rogers attempt could be addressed as a search for an object as non-natural and non-human. This position runs contrary to the general attitude of the meeting, which was to make the object both human and natural, without actually pointing out much difference between the two, as the nature of a man is equalized with that of a human. As it is alien to nature, Rogers’ object is fabricated from the material of the outer world, seeking a durable and tangible enough state in stable continuity in order to become the thing of the world. As it is alien to the human, the architect should leave all rhetorical attempts toward the object being able to affect the human apart from serving as its background. The only morality should come from consistency of the object,[li] which is the only means of addressing the human by actually leaving the attempt to affect the human. As soon as we succeed in fabricating a durable, recognizable object other to both the natural and to the human, as manufacturers rather than creators, we actually strengthen the image of the world and thus serve the opportunity for the individual to be able to identify himself within a delirious collective. It is the reduction of the collective toward the individual that is the main attempt of Rogers’ object rather than its historical relevance per se. It is not the love for historical language that is in the origin of his attempt but rather the consistency of the object as device for the distinction of man: as an object being thrown against man. The language of modern architecture is fit as well as historical language with no crucial difference as long as they create a recognizable pattern. This may be most explicit in the plan of the tower where apartments are not much different from any of European modern movement references within welfare hosing development. This plan could actually be whatever is most affordable and pragmatic while there is certainty that whoever user is will perceive the totalized image of the object of the city and whoever looks upon a tower will perceive the same as well.
Trying to address his critique of the Torre Velasca with a bit more sympathy than Peter Smithson, Bakema pointed out that seeing from ‘a certain distance there is something in the building’s silhouette which suggest that it could have been there for fifty years.’[lii] One could assume that only by hearing this Rogers would be satisfied that his attempt had been completed as much as if it had remained unspoken. As the chain of reasons, though technically and pragmatically rooted, seemed deliberately guided toward what remained inexplicit, making Rogers one of the pioneers of the attempt to overcome the role of the avant-garde intellectual and reduce the architect to the level of the wall-maker in antiquity.
On one hand, the dominant attempt of the Otterlo meeting saw the dissolution of the object toward environment as an adequate response for new vision of holistic collectivity. This vision was based on the ethnological discourse of the primordial and universal man at the same time by taking its biological premises into account. On the other hand, Italian participation saw the object in its antique role, as the outer model that retrieve the sameness of a man and constructs the identity of the individual within retreat from the collective. In the first case, the aura of holistic collectivity failed to distinct between the biological nature of man and its human capacities. In the second, the attempt to distinguish two failed to acknowledge the defeat of homo faber within the automation process. The stage of technological development and electricity cannot fit the categories of homo faber ‘in terms of a gigantic enlargement and continuation of old arts and crafts.’[liii] What substitutes instruments as a means to achieve the prescribed end in killing, interrupting and imitating natural processes is an ‘unchain (of ) natural processes of our own’, and channeling ‘these natural forces into the world itself.’[liv] Finally, nature and the world leave no opposition but merge together into the ‘natural word’ with the final dissolution of the object toward Adorno’s anthropomorphized one.[lv] With the defeat of homo faber as the main hero of Arendt ‘indeed a lord and a master of himself and his doings’, ‘maker and the fabricator and the erector of the world’[lvi] and Tafuri’s dissolution of type within the process of prefabrication seemed that holistic collective of ethnological discourse gain dominance over the polis’ one. It is in this sense that, for the moment, van Eyck’s child took primacy over history and the collective over the individual.
[i] Arendt, H., The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998 (1958), p. 163.
[ii] Id., p. 137.
[iii] Arendt referencing to Lock, Id., p. 79.
[iv] Id., p. 137.
[v] Id., p. 94.
[vi] Id., p. 143.
[vii] Id., p. 95.
[ix] Id., p. 178.
[x] Id., p. 180.
[xi] Id., p. 182.
[xii] Id., p. 179.
[xiv] Id., pp. 52, 53.
[xv] Id., p. 194,195.
[xvi] Id., p. 195.
[xvii] Id., p. 227.
[xviii] Id., p. 198.
[xix] Id., p. 199.
[xx] Id., p. 117.
[xxi] Id., p. 213.
[xxii] Id., p. 256.
[xxiii] Id., p. 41.
[xxiv] Id., p. 43.
[xxvi] Id., p. 45.
[xxvii] Id., p. 254.
[xxviii] Newman, O., CIAM ’59 in Otterlo, Karl Krämer Verlag Stuttgart, Stuttgart, 1961, p. 20, 21
[xxix] Id., p. 10.
[xxxi] Pedret, A., ‘CIAM ’59: the end of CIAM’, in Team 10 1953-1981 in search of a Utopia of the present, ed. by Max Risselada and Dirk van den Heuvel, NAi Publishers, Rotterdam 2005
[xxxii] For a reading of critical themes of postwar modernism see introduction in Anxious Modernisms, ed. by Goldhagen, S. W., and Legault, R., Canadian Centre for Architecture and The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 2000; for discourse on anthropology see Conklin, A., In the Museum of Man, Cornell University Press, 2013
[xxxiii] Newman, O., CIAM ’59 in Otterlo, Karl Krämer Verlag Stuttgart, Stuttgart, 1961, p. 13
[xxxiv] Id., p. 26.
[xxxv] Id., pp. 26, 27.
[xxxvi] Id., p. 28.
[xxxvii] Id., p. 32.
[xxxviii] Id., pp. 31, 32.
[xl] Ockman, J., ‘Venice and New York’, reference to van Eyck’s attack on Manfredo Tafuri arguing that: ‘The path of language as the communication of messages, which is the discourse of humanism does not exist and henceforth is completely closed’, from Europa/America Architetture urbane, alternative suburbane, ed. Franco Raggi (Venice: La Biennale di Venezia, 1978), pp. 174-82.
[xli] On overview to the notion of inhabitability of modernity see eg. Heynen, H., Architecture and Modernity. A Critique, MIT Press, 1999
[xlii] Newman, O., CIAM ’59 in Otterlo, Karl Krämer Verlag Stuttgart, Stuttgart, 1961, p. 92.
[xlvi] Id., pp. 92, 93.
[xlvii] Id., p. 96.
[xlviii] Arendt, H., The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998 (1958), p. 142.
[xlix] Newman, O., CIAM ’59 in Otterlo, Karl Krämer Verlag Stuttgart, Stuttgart, 1961, p. 219.
[l] Id., p. 92.
[li] Id., p. 95., Rogers responding to P. Smithson on issue of morality brought about by the latter
[lii] Id., p. 97.
[liii] Arendt, H., The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998 (1958), p. 148.
[liv] Id., p. 149.
[lv] Adorno, T., ‘Functionalism Today’, Oppositions, no. 17, 1979
[lvi] Arendt, H., The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998 (1958), p. 144.